Sunday, 22 November 2026

DON'T EU DARE, ANDY !!

There is a special quality of British political conversation that returns every few years like a particularly persistent damp patch on the ceiling. Someone of refined metropolitan sensibilities announces, with the air of a long-suffering tutor addressing a dim but well-meaning pupil, that the only cure for our current ailments is to crawl back into the arrangement we spent years prising ourselves free from. The latest outbreak coincides with Prime Minister Andy Burnham’s pilgrimage to Brussels for a “reset” summit, where the talk is of food standards, youth schemes and the vague promise of warmer feelings. Burnham has already floated the idea of rejoining in his lifetime while carefully insisting nothing so drastic will happen this parliament. The rejoiners detect the scent of opportunity. The rest of us detect the familiar aroma of institutional nostalgia mixed with selective amnesia.

The European Union that these enthusiasts wish to re-embrace is not the serene, prosperous, mildly progressive club of their fond recollection. It is a sclerotic customs union with delusions of grandeur, a continent-sized committee that requires three years of consultation to decide the correct curvature of a banana and still manages to get it wrong. Its share of the world economy continues its elegant decline while its member states specialise in the production of debt, regulation and political volatility. France, that perennial “sick man of Europe,” staggers along with growth forecasts that would embarrass a stagnant pond, budget deficits hovering around five and a half per cent, and public debt climbing towards levels that make the markets reach for the smelling salts. Germany, once the industrial powerhouse, nurses the consequences of energy policies so self-confident they border on performance art. The eurozone as a whole limps forward at a modest 1.2 per cent, while sixteen member states are expected to run deficits above the sacred three-per-cent threshold. This is the economic lifeboat into which the rejoiners urge us to leap. One almost admires the optimism.

Politically the picture is even richer. Nearly one in three European voters now backs parties classified as populist, authoritarian or extreme — a post-war record. The Alternative for Germany racks up state victories that leave the centre-right looking like a historical footnote. Marine Le Pen leads the polls in France with the serene confidence of someone who has watched the centre exhaust itself. Italy, Austria, Spain and others continue their rightward drift. The social contract across large parts of the continent resembles less a binding agreement than a set of terms and conditions that fewer citizens are inclined to renew. Borders remain porous in practice even as governments issue stern communiqués. The EU responds with the usual mixture of compulsory asylum quotas, processing hubs in distant African countries (the very idea once denounced as unspeakable when proposed by British Conservatives), and solemn warnings about “Islamist entryism.” Arguments that once marked one out as a provincial reactionary have acquired a certain Brussels respectability. Britain, it turns out, was not behind the curve so much as slightly ahead of a convoy that is now belatedly noticing the same scenery.

The rejoiners’ economic case rests on the touching belief that membership of this particular club confers automatic prosperity. Yet the practical terms of any return would be less a homecoming than a punitive readmission. The old opt-outs, the rebate, the special arrangements — all gone. Free movement restored, larger budget contributions, the probable eventual absorption into the single currency, and a thicket of rules decided by institutions that treat national electorates as an inconvenient afterthought. Polls that show abstract support for “closer ties” collapse when voters are confronted with these details. The British public, it seems, retains a residual capacity to distinguish between smoother trade and the full restoration of an arrangement whose less attractive features they have not forgotten.

There is a particular comic consistency in the Labour position. Burnham speaks of empowering the British people while contemplating the transfer of substantial authority to a highly centralised, undemocratic supranational apparatus. The same party that pursues independent trade deals, distinctive regulatory approaches and adjustments to private-school fees would find such manoeuvres considerably more difficult once locked inside the single market and customs union. One wonders whether the full implications have been absorbed, or whether the emotional satisfaction of reversing 2016 is considered sufficient compensation for the loss of actual agency.

None of this is to pretend that Brexit has been an unalloyed success. The political class that inherited the new freedoms proceeded to exercise them with a conspicuous lack of imagination, preferring high levels of low-skilled immigration and an enthusiastic regulatory apparatus to the competitive advantages that departure made available. Those failures belong to Westminster, not to the act of leaving. The remedy is not to surrender the capacity for independent action but to elect people prepared to use it — to control borders, prioritise citizens, and shape an economy that is competitive rather than merely compliant.

The rejoiners’ project is essentially retrospective. It proposes that the solution to our present difficulties is to return to a club whose own members are discovering, with increasing urgency, many of the same difficulties, only with more committees and worse public finances. Burnham’s Brussels summit is the latest chapter in this long temptation: a polite exchange of modest technical agreements dressed up as historic rapprochement. The EU, ever the needy ex, signals that further intimacy will require deeper commitment. The polite British response remains the same. No. We have seen the club’s membership terms, its declining relevance, its internal revolts and its talent for turning every practical problem into a constitutional drama. Independence may have been mismanaged, but it is still preferable to rejoining a declining bureaucracy that mistakes process for progress and treats democracy as an optional extra.

Wednesday, 18 November 2026

WE WEREN'T EXPECTING YOU ...

In the year of our Lord 2026, the proposition that James Bond still makes any coherent sense has become one of those charming cultural anachronisms, like the idea that a man might still light a woman’s cigarette without first submitting a risk assessment form in triplicate. The original observation was simple enough: from his very first mission, the modern state would be far too busy trying to put 007 behind bars to bother with whatever SPECTRE was cooking up this week. Bond himself would scarcely dare attempt a seduction, lest some retrospective withdrawal of consent turn the entire enterprise into a matter for the Crown Prosecution Service and a carefully worded apology from the Foreign Office. That was the starting point. Events have since conspired to give the thought a rather larger canvas.

Robert Pattinson has been named the next James Bond, and one must begin by wishing him well. The man can act. After the adolescent vampire nonsense of his early fame, he has spent the intervening years accumulating a body of work that is frequently odd, frequently intense, and frequently better than the material deserved. There is a restless intelligence there, a willingness to look slightly unwell or slightly unhinged on camera that is not to be sniffed at. One does not doubt that he will approach the role with the same seriousness he has brought to other unlikely assignments. Seriousness, however, is precisely the problem.

Denis Villeneuve is to direct. Villeneuve is a gifted filmmaker whose gift runs almost exclusively toward the sombre, the atmospheric, and the deliberately unhurried. His films tend to treat narrative as a secondary consideration to mood, and mood as something best achieved by lingering on vast landscapes while the human figures within them look quietly tormented by the weight of existence. Applied to James Bond, this aesthetic raises the possibility that we shall be treated to a two-and-a-half-hour meditation on the loneliness of the licensed killer, punctuated by the occasional muted explosion and a great deal of meaningful silence. The famous quips may survive, but one suspects they will be delivered in the manner of a man who has just read Camus and is not entirely sure the joke is funny any more. The result threatens to be an emasculated Bond: competent, haunted, and carefully divested of the cheerful, almost adolescent swagger that once made the character both absurd and irresistible.

Fans, those tiresome people who still remember what the character was for, had rather hoped for Henry Cavill. Cavill possesses the sort of physical presence that makes the tuxedo look like a natural extension of the man rather than a costume carefully fitted by a nervous wardrobe department. He has the shoulders for it, the jaw for it, and the unapologetic air of a chap who would order the martini without first checking whether the vermouth had been ethically sourced. Paired with someone like Sydney Sweeney as a classic, voluptuous Bond girl—someone who looked as though she had wandered in from a more generous era of cinema rather than a contemporary casting call determined to demonstrate progressive credentials—the combination might have restored a certain old-fashioned pleasure to the proceedings. The eyes of the audience, at least the portion of the audience that still prefers its spies glamorous rather than guilt-ridden, would have recognised the arrangement at once.

Instead, the rumour mill has begun to turn in a more contemporary direction. Among the names floated for the next Bond “girl” is Hunter Schafer. One notes the inverted commas with a certain weary precision, because the word itself is already under quiet renegotiation. The suggestion is offered, in the usual quarters, as a bold and historic step. Historic it may well be. Whether it is wise is another matter entirely. Bond’s relationships with women have always been the most vulnerable part of the formula, easily reduced to caricature or offence. To treat the role of the Bond girl as an opportunity for contemporary social signalling rather than for the particular, slightly ridiculous glamour the series once specialised in is to risk turning the entire enterprise into an exercise in careful messaging. The horror is not personal; it is aesthetic. One does not wish to watch James Bond negotiating pronouns while the villain waits patiently for the scene to finish.

The deeper difficulty remains the one that opened this discussion. The character was conceived in a world that still believed, however naively, that a certain kind of ruthless competence in the service of the realm was worth celebrating. That world has been replaced by one in which competence itself is frequently treated as a form of privilege, and ruthlessness as something requiring immediate therapeutic intervention. Bond’s licence to kill would today be accompanied by a thick file of risk assessments, diversity targets, and mandatory training modules on unconscious bias. His tendency to sleep with the opposition would trigger an investigation before the sheets had cooled. The government that once sent him out would now spend most of its energy trying to explain why it had ever employed such a liability in the first place.

Pattinson may yet surprise us. Actors of talent sometimes do. Villeneuve may discover a previously concealed appetite for the pure, unapologetic nonsense that Bond requires. Stranger things have happened in the history of popular entertainment. Yet the surrounding climate makes such an outcome look less like a probability and more like a faint hope. The franchise has survived changes of actor, changes of tone, and even the occasional change of century. Whether it can survive the determination of the present age to sand every sharp edge off its heroes is a more open question. 

One watches the forthcoming production with a mixture of residual curiosity and the quiet certainty that the real drama will take place not on the screen, but in the careful negotiations that precede every frame.

Monday, 16 November 2026

E-I, A.I, NO ...

Britain once specialised in inventing the future with the cheerful air of a nation that had nothing better to do on a wet Tuesday. The steam engine hissed into existence, railways stitched the countryside into a timetable, television brought moving pictures into the parlour before anyone had quite decided what to do with them, penicillin quietly saved lives while its discoverer remained modest about the mould, and the foundations of modern computing plus the World Wide Web itself arrived with the understated efficiency of a civil servant who had simply done the sums correctly. For a while the British appeared to regard progress as a natural by-product of mild eccentricity and a decent education.

Then something shifted. Not with a bang, of course – that would have been far too dramatic – but with the soft, insistent rustle of committee minutes and the gentle accumulation of forms in triplicate. Decades of political failure, underinvestment, EU bureaucracy and regulatory obsession arrived not as a single catastrophe but as a long, damp season in which the inventive spirit was gradually filed under “pending further consultation”. One can almost picture the scene: a bright idea appears, is examined for its environmental impact, its diversity implications, its potential to inconvenience a distant stakeholder, and is finally returned with a polite note suggesting it be reconsidered after the next election cycle.

The result is a country that now watches the AI revolution unfold with the slightly aggrieved expression of a once-great athlete who has taken up competitive form-filling. The algorithms race ahead elsewhere; the models grow more capable; the applications multiply. Meanwhile Britain, having once supplied the world with the tools to reshape itself, finds itself largely dependent on others to build the next set. There is a certain austere comedy in this. The nation that gave the world the means to compute and to communicate now specialises in the more refined art of regulating itself out of the conversation.

One need not romanticise the past. The old inventiveness was frequently messy, underfunded, and driven by individuals who would today struggle to obtain the necessary permits to light a Bunsen burner. Yet it possessed a useful indifference to the precise wording of subsection 4(b) of the relevant directive. Today the caution is almost admirable in its thoroughness. Every new capability is greeted less with curiosity than with a careful inventory of risks, followed by a lengthy process designed to ensure that no risk is ever taken. The effect is rather like equipping a racing car with so many safety features that it can no longer leave the garage without a convoy of inspectors.

The irony is sharpened by the original urgency of the discussion that prompted these reflections. Artificial intelligence is not merely another consumer gadget; it is already altering the texture of everyday systems – airspace, banking, hospitals, emergency communications – in ways that demand both competence and independence. A country that once prided itself on building the infrastructure of the modern world might reasonably be expected to insist on retaining some sovereign capacity in the technologies that now threaten to redefine security and prosperity. Instead one detects a familiar hesitation, as if the proper response to a rapidly evolving threat is another round of consultation papers.

It is, in its way, quite an achievement. From inventing the future to regulating ourselves out of it requires a special kind of consistency. The same national temperament that once produced world-changing devices now produces world-class procedures for ensuring that nothing world-changing occurs without exhaustive prior approval. One can almost admire the thoroughness. The British have not merely lost a race; they have perfected the art of arriving late while explaining, with perfect courtesy, why arriving on time would have been irresponsible.

There remains, of course, the possibility of recovery. The inventive habit is not entirely extinct; it merely finds itself operating under heavier constraints and with thinner encouragement. Whether the constraints can be eased before the dependence becomes permanent is another matter. For the moment the spectacle continues: a nation that once busied itself inventing the future now busies itself ensuring that the future arrives only after it has been properly risk-assessed, impact-assessed, and preferably invented somewhere else. The achievement is, as noted, considerable. One only hopes the historians of the future will have the paperwork in order when they come to record it.