Thursday, 29 October 2026

SIR PATRICK STEWART (1940 - 2026): AN OBITUARY

Sir Patrick Stewart, who has died at the age of 86, spent a lifetime proving that a bald head could be more expressive than most actors’ entire faces. Born in 1940 in the unpromising surroundings of Mirfield, Yorkshire, he emerged from a childhood marked by the usual post-war austerities and an abusive father, only to discover that the English language, properly spoken, could be a form of armour. He joined the Royal Shakespeare Company and stayed long enough to make the Bard’s verse sound less like homework and more like a series of elegant threats.

Hollywood eventually noticed the threat. In 1987 he was cast as Captain Jean-Luc Picard in Star Trek: The Next Generation, a role that required him to sit in a chair, issue measured orders, and occasionally raise one eyebrow with the force of a photon torpedo. American audiences, unused to an Englishman who did not wave his arms while speaking, took to him immediately. Picard became the thinking person’s action hero: a man who preferred negotiation to phasers, Shakespeare to shouting, and a cup of Earl Grey to the nearest available bar. Stewart played him with such grave authority that even the most absurd alien costumes somehow acquired dignity by proximity.

Not content with one franchise, he later donned a wheelchair and a slightly more benevolent scowl as Professor Charles Xavier in the X-Men films. Here was a man who could make telepathy look like the natural extension of a well-run seminar. Between these two iconic parts he continued to return to the stage, reminding everyone that the man who once commanded the USS Enterprise could still stop a theatre dead with a single pause in Macbeth or The Tempest.

His private life was conducted with the same brisk efficiency he brought to the bridge. Multiple marriages came and went; the last, to Sunny Ozell, appeared to stick. He spoke openly about the violence of his childhood, turning personal darkness into public advocacy without ever sounding as if he expected a medal for it. Knighthood arrived in 2010, an honour he accepted from Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth II with the dry amusement of a man who had already been addressed as “Captain” by half the planet.

Stewart’s great gift was seriousness without solemnity. He could intone “Make it so” as if the fate of the galaxy depended on the precise cadence of three syllables, then undercut the grandeur with a glint that suggested he knew perfectly well how ridiculous the whole enterprise was. He openly sent himself up on Extras with Ricky Gervais, and in animated form as Avery Bullock in American Dad, as well as a marvellously flamboyant theatre director on Fraiser. In an age of actors who mistake volume for intensity, he remained the master of the quiet authority that needs no amplification, without taking himself too seriously. 

He leaves behind a body of work that will continue to make starship bridges and mutant academies feel improbably civilised. The rest of us will simply have to manage without that voice telling us, in the most reasonable tones imaginable, that everything is under control. It never was, of course. But for a few hours at a time, he made us believe it might be.

Wednesday, 28 October 2026

THE GREAT BRITISH GERKHIN DISPENSATION

One approaches the latest Budget not with the trepidation once reserved for the reading of the Riot Act, but with the mild curiosity of a man examining a particularly ambitious jar of condiments. Chancellor John Healey, that tireless shepherd of the national larder, has seen fit to suspend import tariffs on gherkins, marmalade, and a supporting cast of more than a hundred “family favourites.” The nation, we are assured, may now breathe more easily. Up to twenty-one pounds a year more easily, if the Treasury’s arithmetic is to be believed. One almost expects the announcement to have been accompanied by a solemn fanfare of muted cornets and the distant sound of a lid being unscrewed.

It is difficult to overstate the grandeur of the vision. While lesser governments might have busied themselves with trifles such as energy prices, housing, productivity, or the general sensation that the country is held together by hope and residual EU regulations, this administration has gone straight to the heart of the matter: the price of small, vinegary cucumbers. History will record that when the British people stood at the crossroads of destiny, their leaders pointed firmly toward the pickle aisle. Future schoolchildren will learn that the turning point of the mid-2020s was not some tedious structural reform, but the moment the state decided that no citizen should ever again pay full tariff on a cornichon.

The rhetorical packaging is itself a masterpiece of understatement. These are not tax cuts, you understand. They are “everyday fixes.” The phrase has the cosy ring of a handyman arriving to mend a dripping tap, except the handyman is the Chancellor of the Exchequer and the dripping tap is the entire cost of living. One pictures him arriving with a toolbox containing nothing but a jar of gherkins and a slightly sheepish expression. “I’ve fixed it,” he says, holding up the jar. “It was the import duty all along.” The public is invited to feel gratitude of a peculiarly modern kind: the gratitude of people who have been told that the ship is still sinking, but the water in the bilge has been given a pleasant briney flavour.

There is a certain genius in selecting the gherkin as the emblem of national renewal. The gherkin is not a glamorous vegetable. It does not inspire odes. It sits in its jar like a slightly embarrassed guest at a wedding, aware that it is present mainly to provide contrast. Yet here it stands elevated to the status of fiscal instrument. Marmalade, that other pillar of the new dispensation, brings its own tragicomic resonance. Paddington Bear must be wondering whether he has somehow wandered into a particularly austere episode of The Thick of It. One half expects the next Budget to feature tariff relief on fish paste and those mysterious grey biscuits that appear only at the back of elderly relatives’ cupboards.

The opposition, with its customary lack of subtlety, has described the whole affair as an insult. This seems unfair. An insult implies intent and a certain flair. What we have here is more in the nature of a clerical error elevated to policy. The government appears to have consulted a focus group consisting exclusively of people who eat their sandwiches in reverse order and concluded that the real barrier to prosperity was the twelve per cent duty on pickled cucumbers. The resulting savings—approximately fourpence a week if one is generous with the household averages—will, we are told, provide “breathing space.” One can only hope the breathing is done slowly, lest the space prove inadequate.

It would be churlish to deny the wider cultural moment. Pickles have, of late, enjoyed a modest renaissance. Fermented foods are said to be good for the gut microbiome, that fashionable internal parliament which apparently governs our happiness more effectively than the external one. Gen Z has discovered the joys of sourness. Dinner-party hosts now present jars of homemade pickles with the solemnity once reserved for a decent Burgundy. In this climate, the government’s intervention feels almost chic. They have not merely cut a tariff; they have aligned themselves with the zeitgeist. The Chancellor is not a dry fiscal technician. He is a man of the brine. The resulting legislation will doubtless be known to posterity as the Everyday Fixes (Gherkins and Allied Condiment Relief) Act 2026, and future constitutional historians will treat it with the same grave respect currently afforded to the Corn Laws, only with more vinegar.

And yet the satire writes itself with distressing ease. One imagines the Cabinet discussion; 

“What shall we do about the cost of living, Chancellor?” 

“I know—gherkins.” 

“Brilliant. And for the second reading?” 

“Marmalade.” 

“Inspired. The public will never see it coming.” 

There is, of course, a deeper comedy at work. Britain has always specialised in the art of the small gesture dressed up as national strategy. We once ruled a quarter of the globe while arguing about the correct way to take tea. We now face stagnation, demographic headwinds, and the lingering sense that the lights are being switched off one by one, and our response is to make the accompanying gherkins fractionally more affordable. It is almost touching in its domesticity. Other nations pursue industrial strategies or technological sovereignty. We pursue cheaper pickles. There is a kind of integrity in that. At least no one can accuse the government of over-promising.

In the end, the Gherkin Budget will take its place in the long British tradition of political bathos. It will be remembered not for what it achieved—history is rarely so cruel as to measure these things accurately—but for the perfect clarity with which it revealed the governing imagination. When the nation cried out for relief, its leaders reached not for the stars, nor even for the middle distance, but for the jar at the back of the fridge. And in that small, vinegary act of faith, they told us everything we needed to know.

One only hopes the savings materialise before the jars run out. There are, after all, only so many gherkins in the world, and the British public has never been famous for its restraint once the price comes down.

Tuesday, 27 October 2026

WALTER KOENIG (1936 - 2026): AN OBITUARY

Walter Koenig, who has died at the age of 90, spent the better part of a lifetime proving that the universe is large enough for one man to be both the boyish navigator who never quite mastered the accent and the telepathic bureaucrat who could make a space station feel like a police state with a single raised eyebrow.

As Ensign Pavel Chekov on Star Trek: The Original Series, Koenig arrived in the second season like a mop-topped afterthought designed to appease the Russians and the teenagers in equal measure. The accent wandered about the steppes of Central Casting with the confidence of a tourist who has misread the map. Yet there was something disarming in the performance: a young man forever slightly out of his depth, forever ready with a line about inventing something that had clearly been invented elsewhere. He sat at the helm of the Enterprise for three seasons and seven films, ageing only slightly faster than the special effects, and somehow turned a secondary role into a permanent fixture of popular memory. One half-expected him, in later years, to claim that the warp drive itself had been a Soviet innovation.

Then came Babylon 5, and the joke turned sharper. As Alfred Bester of the Psi Corps, Koenig shed the wide-eyed ensign like an old uniform and stepped into the role of a man who could smile while rearranging your thoughts. Twelve episodes across five seasons, and each appearance tightened the screws. Where Chekov had been the eager subordinate, Bester was the superior who never needed to raise his voice. Koenig played him with a quiet, almost bureaucratic menace, as if the real threat to free will was not some alien armada but a civil servant with a clipboard and the ability to read your mind. Fans who had grown up watching him plot courses through asteroid belts now found themselves rooting, against their better judgement, for the man who plotted courses through other people’s heads.

It was, in its way, a perfect career arc: from the navigator who always looked slightly surprised by the stars to the telepath who was never surprised by anything. Koenig understood the joke and, more importantly, never spoiled it by explaining the punchline. In an industry that prefers its actors to stay in one orbit, he simply changed ships and kept flying. The final frontier, it turned out, was range.

Saturday, 24 October 2026

TOM SKERRITT (1931 - 2026): AN OBITUARY

Tom Skerritt, who has died at 93 of what his family discreetly called natural causes, spent a lifetime proving that Hollywood’s idea of an everyman was usually a man who looked as if he had just stepped out of a barbershop after a long discussion about trout fishing and the weather. He was the sort of actor who made competence look glamorous and glamour look faintly unnecessary.

Born in Detroit in 1933, Skerritt did the decent American thing of joining the Air Force before anyone thought of casting him as a pilot. He then drifted into acting the way other men drift into real estate: almost by accident, and with rather better results. Robert Altman spotted him for M*A*S*H*, where he played Duke Forrest with the air of a man who had already seen the joke and decided not to spoil it for everyone else. A decade later Ridley Scott put him in charge of the Nostromo in Alien. As Captain Dallas he demonstrated that the only rational response to a chest-bursting xenomorph is a quiet professionalism that never quite survives the second act. Audiences remembered the creature; professionals remembered Skerritt’s calm.

He was Viper in Top Gun, the instructor who made Tom Cruise look like a talented intern. He was the quietly suffering husband in Steel Magnolias, the philosophical father in A River Runs Through It, and, for four seasons of Picket Fences, the small-town sheriff who treated moral complexity as if it were a parking ticket that still had to be written out. An Emmy followed, which he accepted with the mild surprise of a man who had never expected the post office to notice him.

Skerritt never chased stardom with the desperation of those who fear obscurity more than death. He simply kept turning up, looking reliable, and leaving the scenery slightly better arranged than he found it. In later years he taught storytelling to veterans and worried about rivers, activities that suggested a man who had decided the real drama was happening off-camera.

He is survived by his wife Julie, five children, and the lingering suspicion that most leading men are merely elaborately trained versions of Tom Skerritt. Hollywood will replace him with someone younger, better lit, and less interesting. The rest of us will simply miss the quiet authority of a man who never needed to raise his voice to be heard.

Thursday, 22 October 2026

BE READY … FOR THE BLEEDING OBVIOUS

The British government, in its infinite wisdom and with all the urgency of a man discovering that the kettle has been left on, has launched something called the Be Ready campaign. One imagines the Cabinet Office, that citadel of quiet despair, stirring itself at last from its customary torpor to issue a solemn directive: the citizenry must now prepare for emergencies. Not the emergencies of the past—those vulgar, noisy affairs involving bombs or actual fighting—but the more refined modern variety: a power cut, a spot of bad weather, or the internet going on the blink for an afternoon. In other words, Tuesday.

The website, beready.campaign.gov.uk, is a masterpiece of the bureaucratic sublime. It instructs the householder to assemble a modest hoard of non-perishable food, bottled water, and the sort of batteries that have not been manufactured since the last Labour government. One is to manage, if the lights go out, for a heroic three days. Three days! The same period, one notes, that the average British family already spends waiting for a plumber, a GP appointment, or a coherent statement from any minister on any subject whatever. The campaign’s great innovation is to suggest that this familiar national condition might, on occasion, be caused by something other than incompetence.

There is a checklist, of course. There is always a checklist. Sign up for the Priority Services Register, so that the water company can more efficiently fail to notice you when the pipes freeze. Keep a torch. Keep a radio that does not require the grid. Keep a sense of humour, though that last item is nowhere listed, perhaps because the authors of the document have never encountered one. The whole enterprise is framed as a bold alignment with our European neighbours—France, Ireland, the Netherlands—where, we are told, such advice is simply part of everyday life. One pictures the sturdy Dutchman, upon rising, checking his emergency tinned beans before cycling to work through the carefully managed floods. The Frenchman, between strikes, topping up his mineral water. The Irishman, ever practical, ensuring the whiskey is within reach. Britain, late to the party as usual, now arrives waving a laminated sheet and a slightly apologetic expression.

What is being prepared for, exactly? Severe weather, cyber attacks, the temporary interruption of essential services. In short, the ordinary weather of modern existence. The government, having spent years ensuring that the electricity grid is a delicate tissue of good intentions and Chinese components, the water companies are private monopolies with the civic instincts of a pirate, and the digital infrastructure is one ransomware note away from silence, now turns to the public and says, with perfect gravity: you might want to have some biscuits in the cupboard. It is rather like a man who has spent the evening sawing through the legs of the dining table and then, as it collapses, advising the guests that they should perhaps remain seated in a braced position.

The satire, as it always inevitably does, writes itself, which is fortunate, because the campaign’s authors appear to have been too busy drafting checklists to notice the comedy of their own position. A nation that cannot reliably keep the trains running, the hospitals staffed, or the prisons unoccupied by the same faces is now earnestly instructing its citizens on the finer points of household continuity planning. Be ready, the government says. Ready for what? For the government itself, one suspects. For the slow, polite, thoroughly documented failure of systems that were once supposed to work without the citizen having to keep emergency rations against their collapse.

The campaign is to last three years. Three years of gentle reminders, social-media posts, radio advertisements aimed at the particularly vulnerable (families with young children, the elderly, people who use food banks—groups the state has already done so much to enlarge). One can already hear the advertisements in the mind’s ear: a reassuring voice explaining that, should the lights fail, one need not panic, provided one has followed the checklist. Panic, after all, is the exclusive prerogative of officialdom. The rest of us are merely to be ready.

There is a touching faith here in the power of advice. The British public, long accustomed to being told that everything is under control right up until the moment it is not, is now invited to participate in its own resilience. Stock the cupboard. Sign the form. Volunteer, if you must. The state, having largely retreated from the business of actually providing resilience, will content itself with distributing leaflets about it. It is the administrative equivalent of a doctor who, upon diagnosing a patient with a broken leg, hands him a pamphlet on the importance of walking carefully.

One detects, beneath the cheerful practicality, a faint note of Cold War nostalgia. There was a time when the government issued Protect and Survive booklets advising the populace on how to paint the windows white and hide under the stairs while the world ended. Those documents at least possessed a certain tragic grandeur. The current effort is more modest: hide under the stairs with a tin of beans and a wind-up radio tuned to whatever remains of the BBC, waiting for the power to return or the next ministerial statement, whichever is the less probable. The nuclear winter has been replaced by the possibility of a slightly longer than usual Tuesday afternoon.

And so the campaign rolls out, a three-year exercise in stating the obvious with the full apparatus of the modern state. Households will be encouraged. Charities will be consulted. Advertising will be placed. Somewhere in Whitehall a junior official will be promoted for having thought of the Priority Services Register. Meanwhile the rest of us, in the time-honoured British fashion, will continue as before: slightly damp, mildly inconvenienced, and, when the lights eventually flicker, reaching not for the official checklist, but for the nearest bottle of something stronger than water.

Tuesday, 20 October 2026

THE CAPTCHA OF CIVILISATION

The modern world, we are solemnly informed, is a triumph of convenience. One has only to observe the average citizen attempting to withdraw twenty pounds or purchase a cheese sandwich to appreciate the full magnificence of this claim. Where once a simple transaction required little more than a human being, a scrap of paper and a mutual understanding that the paper represented something of value, the same modest ambition now demands a small digital opera of passwords last recalled in a previous geological epoch, authentication codes that arrive precisely after the app has locked itself in a fit of pique, and a captcha contest in which one must identify every blurred bicycle with the solemnity of a wartime aircraft spotter. The chatbot, when finally summoned, assures one that it understands one’s frustration. 

It does not, of course. Understanding is not among its subroutines. Polite dismissal is. Buying lunch once involved the exchange of money for food in the presence of another person. That arrangement, though primitive, possessed a certain clarity. Today the same modest hunger frequently requires a stable Wi-Fi signal, a QR code that expired forty-seven seconds earlier, two-factor authentication, and a telephone whose battery has declined to one per cent while an algorithm decides whether one’s face is sufficiently human to be allowed to pay for its own sandwich. The face, it should be noted, belongs to the same person who has been wearing it without incident for several decades. The algorithm remains unconvinced. Progress, we are told, consists in submitting to this ritual of self-doubt before one may eat.

There was a time when losing one’s keys resulted in the inconvenience of being locked out of one’s house. The modern equivalent is more refined. One may now be locked out of one’s own telephone because a password has been forgotten or because the device, after prolonged and intimate acquaintance with its owner’s physiognomy, has developed doubts about the authenticity of the face presented to it. The telephone, having been granted the power to recognise its master, exercises that power with the capriciousness of a minor deity. The owner is left standing in the street, staring at a darkened screen, contemplating the philosophical implications of being rejected by a piece of glass and aluminium that contains, among other things, photographs of his children and the only record of his bank balance.

Navigation, once a matter of asking a stranger for directions and receiving an answer of greater or lesser accuracy, has been replaced by the blue dot. One stares at this blue dot until the signal expires, at which point one discovers that one has no idea which way is north. The satellite navigation system, for its part, would like to know one’s precise location for the rest of eternity in exchange for the privilege of being occasionally wrong. The stranger in the street has been rendered obsolete; the algorithm has not yet learned manners. Customer service has undergone a similar elevation. Where once there stood a person capable of answering a specific question, there now exists a vast FAQ delivered by a robot that has never seen the product in question. The exchange concludes with the inevitable inquiry, “Was this helpful?”, followed by a survey about the survey concerning the standard of customer service. The queue, in the old days, contained human beings. The chatbot contains a script and an almost supernatural incapacity to address the particular. 

One is left with the sensation of having been processed rather than assisted. We have traded paper maps for telephones that require a signal, paper tickets for applications that crash at the precise moment one reaches the barrier, and paper books for subscriptions that evaporate the instant a company “updates its terms.” Meanwhile the countryside is steadily paved with data centres so that an algorithm may generate an image of a cat wearing a tiny hat. One continues, nevertheless, to receive hosepipe bans after four consecutive sunny days, even as those same data centres consume water with the enthusiasm of a desert caravan. The irony is not lost on the algorithm, for the simple reason that the algorithm does not notice irony.

Friendship itself has been quietly reorganised. Social life now consists largely of a group chat in which no one has suggested the pub since March. The elderly, wishing merely to consult a doctor, require an adult child, a login credential and a working knowledge of information technology. Banks close their doors. General practitioners retreat behind applications. Parking, menus, council tax, pensions and the electricity bill all demand another code, another verification, another demonstration that one is not a robot attempting to settle one’s own heating account. The cumulative effect is a population that is less free, more thoroughly tracked, constantly interrupted, and still late because the parking application has crashed for want of a reliable signal in the street.

And yet, after all this, one may take comfort in the knowledge that one correctly identified the online traffic lights in a captcha grid and thereby proved, to the satisfaction of an unseen machine, that one is human. Progress, apparently, consists in repeatedly establishing this elementary fact to entities that themselves possess no humanity at all. Clive James might have observed that civilisation advances by increasing the number of things one must prove before one is permitted to live. On present evidence, he would not have been far wrong.

Sunday, 18 October 2026

NOT IN MY NAME, ROLY-POLY

There comes a moment in the life of any self-respecting nation when its leaders, having exhausted the usual repertoire of excuses for incompetence, discover that nothing quite concentrates the public mind like the prospect of sending other people’s sons to be blown to pieces. Britain appears to have reached that moment with the quiet efficiency of a man discovering a forgotten bottle of sherry and deciding it will do for breakfast. 

The decision, we are told in the more elevated tones of Whitehall, has already been taken somewhere in the digestive tract of the British establishment: direct conflict with Russia is on the cards. The only remaining task is to frighten the rest of us into regarding this as either a jolly good idea or, at the very least, the sort of weather one simply has to put up with.

It is the old march to 1914, only this time the brass bands have been replaced by solemn briefings and the recruiting posters feature fewer moustaches and more PowerPoint slides. Then, as now, a surprising number of those who once called themselves the left will discover an unexpected fondness for the national colours. Patriotism, it turns out, is the last refuge of the progressive who has run out of progressive things to say. 

They will go along to get along, muttering about solidarity while the generals, the arms manufacturers and the perennial products of Eton prepare to play their favourite game: the one in which young men from the housing estates and the schemes are invited to demonstrate their civic virtue by becoming pawns.

These young men, it must be conceded, have been admirably prepared for the role. Looking out from their estates upon a future that consists largely of the absence of one, they present the authorities with a ready supply of willing volunteers—or, if willingness proves insufficient, of young men who can be persuaded that refusal is somehow unpatriotic. Conscription, whether formal or the softer kind that arrives by way of economic desperation and relentless messaging, has always relied on this convenient coincidence of hopelessness and hierarchy. The system that has created far more problems than it could ever solve now finds itself in need of a war to keep the lid on. 

Eduardo Galeano put it with characteristic economy: the marketplace of fear requires a steady supply of monsters. Putin’s Russia has been cast in the role with all the subtlety of a pantomime villain. Once upon a time parents warned naughty children that the bogeyman would come; now the same service is performed by politicians who assure us the Russians are coming unless we do as we are told.

The enemy without, of course, is useful chiefly for the control it offers within. It is not Moscow that truly keeps the establishment awake at night so much as the low, persistent murmur of domestic discontent. War fever has the great advantage of turning that murmur into a more manageable roar of martial enthusiasm. 

We have been here before. They lied to us about Yugoslavia. They lied to us about Iraq. They lied to us about Libya. They lied to us about Syria. The pattern is so consistent that one begins to suspect it is less a series of unfortunate errors than a governing principle. To believe the current version of events requires a capacity for selective amnesia that would be impressive in a goldfish.

Siegfried Sassoon, who knew something about the difference between the recruiting office and the trench, described war as the hell where youth and laughter go. The observation has not aged. The fight that matters now is the one that prevents the youth of this generation from being packed off into the same hell that claimed the youth of his. 

Conscription—whether by legal instrument or by the quieter coercion of narrative and necessity—is the mechanism by which that packing is achieved. It takes young men who have already been short-changed by the economy and invites them to settle the remaining debt with their lives. The generals will speak of duty; the manufacturers will speak of readiness; the politicians will speak of inevitability. The young men themselves will be expected to speak very little at all.

There is a certain dry comedy in watching a political class that can scarcely organise a reliable train service suddenly discover the moral clarity required for continental war. The comedy, however, is of the sort that ends with someone else paying the bill. Never again is not a slogan for the history books; it is a practical instruction for the present. 

The young men on the estates and the schemes have already been offered a future of no future. They should not be asked to improve upon that offer by dying for it.

Saturday, 17 October 2026

MUSK'S CAR FLIES WHILST BRUSSELS TETHERS US

The Tesla Roadster now hurtling through the void is not, strictly speaking, flying. Flying implies purpose, control, and the faint possibility of landing somewhere useful, preferably with the wheels still attached. What Elon Musk achieved in 2018 was rather more ambitious and considerably more American: he took a perfectly good electric sports car, bolted it to the business end of a Falcon Heavy rocket, and flung it into interplanetary space with a mannequin in a spacesuit at the wheel, tuned permanently to David Bowie. The car is currently somewhere between Earth and Mars, doing laps of the solar system like a bored millionaire who has run out of private islands. It is the most expensive piece of space junk in human history, and the most elegant.

One must admire the sheer theatricality of the gesture. While lesser nations debate the precise angle at which a yoghurt pot lid should be recycled, Musk simply decided that the cosmos needed a cherry-red convertible and made it so. The Roadster’s trajectory is eccentric in every sense. It will, according to the orbital mechanics people who still have jobs, spend the next few million years looping past Earth and Mars, occasionally coming close enough for future generations to wave at it through telescopes, provided they still have telescopes and have not been required to tether them to the observatory for safety reasons.

The humour of the enterprise is pure Musk: a mixture of engineering bravado and adolescent showmanship. Starman, the dummy driver, sits there forever in a posture of studied nonchalance, one hand on the wheel, the other presumably scrolling through the universe’s least useful playlist. The car’s battery will eventually die, the paint will fade under unfiltered solar radiation, and the whole ensemble will become a silent monument to the proposition that if you have enough money and enough rockets, the laws of taste can be temporarily suspended. Clive James once observed that the English talent for understatement was matched only by the American talent for overstatement; here the overstatement has achieved escape velocity.

And this, of course, is the real point. Such magnificent absurdities arise only from the particular soil of American free-market capitalism, that unruly garden in which billionaires are allowed to plant rockets the way other people plant hydrangeas. The same system that produces Silicon Valley’s more tiresome excesses also produces the occasional spectacle of a car doing what cars were never meant to do: leave the planet altogether. One may disapprove of the concentration of wealth, the cult of personality, the tweets that read like unfinished ransom notes. One may still find oneself smiling at the image of a Roadster out there among the asteroids, its headlights permanently off, its radio forever silent, embodying the principle that if something is worth doing, it is worth doing in a manner calculated to annoy the European Commission.

Contrast this with the European Union’s crowning technological achievement of recent years: the tethered bottle cap. After years of deliberation, impact assessments, stakeholder consultations, and the solemn weighing of plastic against planetary survival, Brussels succeeded in ensuring that the lid of your mineral water can never again be lost under the car seat. The cap remains attached by a thin plastic hinge, flapping about like a broken wing whenever you try to drink. It is an innovation of pure negation—an improvement that makes the original object slightly worse while congratulating itself on moral progress. One can almost hear the collective sigh of bureaucratic satisfaction as the directive was signed: another small victory for the precautionary principle, another small defeat for the ordinary human desire to open a bottle without a fight.

The same institutional temperament that gave us the tethered bottle top is incapable of producing a car in space. They can’t even take the top off a biro without commissioning eight separate environmental reports to discuss the implications, and even then they would only come to the conclusion that the top needs to be tethered to the pen, making it impossible to write with. The biro itself would then be subjected to a life-cycle analysis, a carbon-footprint audit, and a public consultation on the ethical implications of ink. By the time the process concluded, the pen would be illegal and the only permitted writing instrument would be a recyclable stylus permanently attached to a government-approved tablet that refuses to turn on unless you have completed a GDPR compliance form.

There is something almost poignant in the comparison. America, for all its chaos and inequality, still retains the capacity for grand, slightly ridiculous gestures. Europe, for all its civilisation and social protections, has perfected the art of the small, slightly ridiculous regulation. One launches cars into the heavens; the other makes sure you cannot lose the lid of your lemonade. Both, in their way, are expressions of national character. One dreams of Mars while arguing on Twitter. The other dreams of a perfectly sorted recycling bin while arguing about the precise definition of a single-use plastic. Musk’s Roadster will, in the fullness of geological time, either collide with something interesting or continue its lonely circuit until the sun expands and swallows it. By then the tethered bottle caps of Europe will have long since been replaced by some even more ingenious form of mandatory attachment—perhaps bottle caps tethered to the user, or users tethered to the European Parliament. 

In the meantime, the car sails on, a silent rebuke to caution, a chrome-and-leather reminder that sometimes the most civilised thing a civilisation can do is waste a perfectly good sports car on a cosmic practical joke. The rest of us are left down here, struggling with our hinged lids, wondering whether the next great leap for mankind will require planning permission.

Monday, 12 October 2026

THE INCONVENIENT AWAKENING

We stand, dear reader it seems, on the threshold of a great collective realisation. Not the sort of epiphany that arrives with trumpets and a change of government, but the quieter, more embarrassing kind in which large numbers of people look up from their phones and notice that the scenery has been painted on cardboard all along. The European Union, we are about to discover, has been industriously feeding the war in Ukraine. The climate crisis, upon closer inspection, turns out to be communism wearing a recycled anorak. And Covid was the most ambitious confidence trick in recorded history. After these successive illuminations, the anger will be terrible, and the responsible parties will be chastised without pity. Or so the forecast runs. One can only hope the chastisement arrives before the public’s attention is diverted by the next series of whatever is currently being streamed.

Consider first the European Union’s alleged role as quartermaster to the Ukrainian conflict. It is a curious charge, since the Union’s most conspicuous martial achievement to date has been the solemn issuing of strongly worded statements from Brussels. One pictures the generals in Moscow poring over these communiqués by candlelight, trembling at the prospect of another round of targeted sanctions on luxury handbags. Yet the accusation persists that the EU somehow prolonged the agony by a combination of moral posturing, arms shipments that arrived after the relevant tanks had already been destroyed, and an unshakeable belief that history could be negotiated into submission by committee. There is a certain sardonic justice in the idea. An organisation designed to prevent wars by making everyone fill out the same forms has instead discovered that forms make excellent kindling. The bureaucracy, having spent decades perfecting the art of delay, has now applied that talent to the matter of peace. The result, we are invited to believe, is a conflict that continues not despite the EU’s efforts but because of them. One almost admires the efficiency.

And now, as if the previous revelations were insufficiently rich in irony, we are treated to the spectacle of Andy Burnham, the newly elevated Prime Minister, embarking on what can only be described as a rather forlorn campaign to unpick Brexit by discovering, at this late hour, that the Russians did it. Having asked the question upon entering Downing Street—rather in the manner of a nervous new boarder inquiring whether the school bully had already stolen his tuck—he received the “clear answer” that yes, Moscow had interfered. One imagines the relief with which this intelligence was received. At last, an explanation for the referendum result that does not require accepting that large numbers of British voters simply preferred to leave. 

Burnham does not quite say the vote was invalid; that would require a degree of conviction he has never quite managed. Instead he offers the weaker, more pathetic formulation: the result remains “legitimate,” of course, yet somehow tainted enough to justify a fresh round of closer ties with the very club the country chose to quit. It is the political equivalent of accepting a divorce settlement while still turning up at the former marital home with flowers and a tentative suggestion that the whole thing might have been the neighbour’s idea. The desperation is almost touching. Here is a man who, after years of watching the national argument from the relative safety of Manchester, now finds himself in the top job and immediately reaches for the oldest excuse in the book: foreigners meddled, the people were misled, and therefore the awkward democratic outcome may safely be revisited. One almost feels sorry for him. Almost.

Then there is the climate crisis, revealed at last as communism in green face-paint. This is an elegant diagnosis. For years the more devout advocates of net-zero have spoken with the unshakeable certainty once reserved for dialectical materialism. The science is settled, the models are beyond question, and anyone who notices that the models occasionally forecast ice ages or tropical paradises with equal confidence is simply a denier. The proposed remedies have a familiar ring: central planning of energy, the reallocation of resources according to ideological purity, and the quiet suggestion that individual freedom is a luxury the planet can no longer afford. Carbon credits circulate like the old industrial quotas, only with better branding. The faithful speak of “just transitions” in the same tone earlier generations reserved for the withering away of the state. One need not deny that the climate is changing to notice that the solutions on offer frequently resemble a five-year plan written by people who have never balanced a household budget. The sardonic observer is left wondering whether the real emergency is the temperature or the opportunity it provides for rearranging society along more obedient lines.

And Covid. Ah, Covid. The greatest scam in history, according to the emerging orthodoxy of the newly awakened. Here the irony is almost too rich to bear. An entire civilisation agreed, with remarkable speed, to treat a novel virus as an existential drama requiring the suspension of ordinary life. Governments discovered that populations would accept almost any restriction if sufficiently alarmed. Scientists discovered that certainty was more useful than data. Pharmaceutical companies discovered that emergency authorisation was a remarkably efficient business model. And the public, having been told that two weeks would flatten the curve, eventually discovered that the curve had developed a life of its own and rather liked the view from the top. Masks became talismans, vaccines became loyalty tests, and dissent became a form of social death. When the official narrative began to fray—when the origin stories multiplied, when the efficacy claims required constant adjustment, when the excess deaths stubbornly refused to follow the approved script—the response was not humility but amnesia. The whole episode is now treated as an awkward interlude best forgotten, rather like a dinner party at which everyone got spectacularly drunk and said things they now regret. To call it a scam is perhaps too neat; it was more like a collective hallucination in which the principal beneficiaries kept remarkably clear heads.

What follows, we are assured, will be terrible anger. The public, having been patient beyond the point of absurdity, will finally demand accounts. The responsible will be chastised without pity. One waits with interest to see the form this chastisement takes. Will the architects of endless European summits be made to sit through their own previous speeches? Will the climate commissars be required to heat their homes with the same intermittent energy sources they prescribe for the rest of us? Will the public-health officials who discovered authoritarian talents they never knew they possessed be subjected to the same level of scrutiny they once applied to the unvaccinated? History suggests that the truly responsible have a gift for being elsewhere when the bill arrives. Anger, however terrible, has a short half-life. It tends to dissipate into new distractions, new crises, new opportunities for the same people to offer the same solutions with only slightly altered vocabulary.

There is a melancholy comedy in all this. Societies that pride themselves on rationality appear capable of remarkable periods of collective self-deception, followed by equally remarkable periods of retrospective outrage. The pattern is almost comforting in its predictability. We believe the experts until the experts are proven wrong, then we believe a different set of experts who explain why the first set were compromised, until those too are found wanting. The cycle continues, and the one constant is that someone, somewhere, is writing a strongly worded statement about it. The coming awakening, if it arrives, will no doubt produce its own literature of recrimination, its own committees of inquiry, its own solemn promises that such things must never happen again. And then, with any luck, we shall all be distracted by the next emergency, which will of course be entirely different and require entirely new sacrifices.

In the meantime, the dry observer can only note that the human capacity for delayed recognition remains one of our more reliable traits. We notice the cardboard scenery only after the play has run for several seasons and the actors have begun to look tired. The anger that follows may indeed be terrible. Whether it proves effective is another question entirely. History, that most sardonic of chroniclers, has seen this performance before.

Sunday, 11 October 2026

LABOUR'S DIGITAL DOUBLE-STANDARD

It is a truth universally acknowledged, or at least widely tweeted, that a government in possession of a large majority must be in want of consistency. The latest illustration arrives with characteristic understatement from the Prime Minister’s office. From next year, should you wish to open a fresh account on Instagram, TikTok or the platform formerly known as Twitter, you will be invited—politely, of course—to upload a form of identification or submit to a facial age scan. The stated purpose is the protection of the young from the perils of the infinite scroll. 

Fair enough. Children should not be left unsupervised in the digital sweetshop. Yet the same administration, under the energetic leadership of Andy Burnham, is simultaneously advancing legislation that would allow a voter to stroll into a polling station armed with nothing more photographic than a bank card. The card need not even display a full name in some interpretations; initials will apparently suffice. One is left wondering whether the electorate is considered more trustworthy than a teenager with a smartphone, or simply less inconvenient.

The irony is almost too neat to be accidental, social media, that noisy agora of the age, is to be placed under a regime of verification so that the under-sixteens may be kept out. The polling station, by contrast, is to have its existing photo-ID requirement diluted in the name of accessibility. The Representation of the People Bill, we are told, is being hurried along with a speed that suggests either profound confidence in the purity of the democratic process or a certain anxiety about the calendar. Bank cards are to be admitted as proof of identity. The Electoral Commission has expressed reservations about the reduced security of a document that carries neither likeness nor, necessarily, unambiguous personal details. These reservations have been noted and, in the classic manner of governments everywhere, filed under “concerns that will be addressed in due course.”

One need not be a conspiracy theorist of the more florid variety to observe that identity checks at the ballot box were introduced precisely because personation—voting in someone else’s name—is not an abstract theoretical risk. It has occurred. It has been prosecuted. The previous requirement of photographic identification was imperfect, as all human arrangements are, yet it raised a modest barrier against the more casual forms of abuse. Replacing that barrier with a plastic rectangle that can be obtained, lost, or, in less scrupulous hands, acquired with relative ease is presented as an act of democratic expansion. The native British working class, whose grandparents built the Labour movement in the mills and the mines and the union halls, might be forgiven for wondering whether the expansion is aimed in their direction. Those voters still tend to possess, or at least to understand the value of, a passport, a driving licence or a pensioner’s travel pass. The new dispensation appears more solicitous of those for whom documentary formality has historically been optional.

There is a certain historical poignancy here. The Labour Party was founded by men and women who believed that the franchise should be guarded as carefully as the rights it conferred. They fought for the vote; they did not fight for the right to treat the vote as a casual convenience. To dilute the safeguards while simultaneously tightening the screws on online anonymity looks less like progressive modernisation and more like selective vigilance. One set of rules for the digital commons, where the young must be protected from themselves; another for the polling booth, where the integrity of the count is apparently robust enough to withstand a lighter touch. The suspicion inevitably arises that the lighter touch is preferred not because fraud is impossible, but because a certain elasticity in the electoral roll may prove useful should the government’s mandate require a little artificial reinforcement.

Burnham’s defenders will insist that bank cards are ubiquitous, that the change merely removes an unnecessary obstacle for the poor and the transient, and that any talk of fraud is the fever dream of reactionaries who prefer fewer people to vote at all. The argument has a surface plausibility. Yet the same government that frets over the possibility of a fifteen-year-old creating a TikTok account shows a remarkable nonchalance about the possibility of an ineligible person casting a ballot. The asymmetry is instructive. Algorithms must be policed with biometric thoroughness; the ballot box may rely on the honour system, supplemented by a piece of plastic issued by a bank that has no particular interest in electoral purity.

One detects, beneath the language of inclusion, a quiet abandonment of the party’s original constituency. The native working class—those who still live in the towns that once returned solid Labour majorities, who pay their taxes, who send their children to the local comprehensive, and who notice when the rules seem to bend more readily for newcomers than for themselves—are offered the consolation that democracy is being made more accessible. They may be excused for feeling that accessibility is being redefined in a manner that dilutes their own hard-won voice. A false mandate, after all, need not be fabricated through overt criminality. It can be assembled through a series of small administrative adjustments that make verification less exacting and the electorate more elastic.

The late Miles Kingston, were he still with us and still inclined to comment on the passing political carnival, might have observed that the British genius for hypocrisy has rarely been displayed with such bureaucratic elegance. To demand a face scan before one may post a cat video, while accepting a debit card as sufficient warrant to help choose a government, is a performance of priorities that would have delighted the more satirical corners of the old television review columns. It is not that electoral fraud is being openly invited. It is that the obstacles to it are being courteously lowered, while the obstacles to anonymous social-media mischief are being raised. The working-class founders of the Labour Party, one suspects, would have recognised the difference. They understood that the franchise is not a consumer service to be made frictionless; it is a trust. Treat it as the former, and it ceases, gradually but inexorably, to function as the latter.

In the end the policy reveals more about the government’s hierarchy of anxieties than any press release ever could. Children must be protected from the internet. The integrity of the vote, apparently, can look after itself. Or at least it can be trusted to look after the interests of those currently holding the levers. The native British working class, who once formed the backbone of the movement, are left to contemplate the spectacle of a party that remembers their history mainly as a decorative slogan while adjusting the practical machinery of democracy in directions that may not favour them. 

It is a curious form of progressive politics that makes it harder to open a social-media account than to cast a ballot. One can only hope the irony is not entirely lost on those responsible for it.

Saturday, 10 October 2026

ZELENSKY: SABOTEUR-IN-CHIEF

There comes a moment in every long-running international farce when the leading man, having milked the audience’s sympathy for all it is worth, overplays his hand and reveals that the tears were never quite real. Volodymyr Zelensky has arrived at that moment with the grace of a comedian who has forgotten the punchline and now stands blinking in the spotlight, wondering why the laughter has turned sour. The notion that this former television actor was simply the plucky steward of a distressed fledgling democracy always required a certain suspension of disbelief. One bought the ticket, of course; the alternative was to look like a brute. But the performance has gone on rather too long, and the props department has begun to look threadbare.

He has treated successive attempts at settlement with the petulance of a child who discovers that the birthday presents are not quite up to the standard advertised in the brochure. Peace deals arrive, are examined, and are then rejected with an air of wounded virtue that would have done credit to a Victorian governess. The allowance, naturally, must continue. Why, after all, would a man who has suspended elections, placed certain churches under the official frown, and arranged the political furniture to suit a more permanent occupancy, suddenly decide that peace is in his interest? Peace would require him to face the electorate again. Peace would require him to explain why the war that was meant to end last year, or the year before that, has somehow become a lifestyle. Dictators, even the telegenic variety, tend to find the prospect unappealing.

Into this prolonged theatrical run has stepped a piece of unexpected pragmatism from an unlikely quarter. The arrangement between Trump and Putin concerning diesel supplies—reached after repeated American requests that Ukraine cease striking Russian refineries had been met with the usual theatrical deafness—has the distinct smell of realism about it. Global markets do not care for the finer points of moral posturing; they care for the price of fuel. When those prices begin to inconvenience voters in the United States, even the most high-minded rhetoric starts to look expensive. The deal does not, of course, end the war. It does something more useful: it removes one of the incentives for prolonging it. By reducing the leverage that energy disruption provided, it makes further escalation less attractive to those who had grown rather fond of the disruption. In the arid language of diplomacy, this is what passes for a peace-preserving measure. One notes it without needing to break into applause; the mere fact that someone has finally noticed the cost of the performance is itself a small mercy.

Meanwhile, across the Channel and beyond the Rhine, certain European leaders have been conducting their own quieter calculation. The war has offered a convenient distraction from the awkward business of domestic accountability. Conscription talk, or the threat of it, has floated about the corridors of Brussels and various national capitals with a regularity that suggests more than pure military necessity. Young European men—particularly those of the demographic that still forms the statistical backbone of several electorates—have been invited to contemplate the possibility of becoming cannon fodder in a conflict whose strategic aims have grown increasingly elastic. The phrase “phony war” may be unkind, yet it is difficult to escape the impression that the conflict has served some as a useful holding pattern: a way of postponing the day when French and German voters must be faced with the ordinary questions of governance, prosperity, and demographic reality. Endless solidarity with Ukraine has the useful secondary effect of postponing the more awkward solidarity with one’s own taxpayers.

That particular hope is now under strain. Once the American side has demonstrated a willingness to deal directly with Moscow over matters that affect its own electorate, the European posture of permanent moral elevation becomes harder to maintain. The leaders of France and Germany, who have grown accustomed to treating the war as a kind of external morality play that conveniently excuses them from explaining their own domestic arrangements, find the stage lights suddenly turned upon themselves. There is nowhere left to hide. The electorate, that eternally ungrateful audience, has a habit of noticing when the script has run out of plot.

An end to the war in Ukraine is not a romantic aspiration; it is a practical necessity. Prolonged conflict has a way of consuming the very societies that claim to be defending civilisation. The Trump-Putin diesel arrangement, whatever its other imperfections, has the modest virtue of introducing a note of economic realism into a drama that had become addicted to pure gesture. If it helps to shorten the fighting, so much the better. The alternative is to continue indefinitely in the service of a narrative that has already outlived its usefulness, while European governments quietly hope that the demographic and political consequences can be deferred a little longer. History, as usual, is not in the habit of granting such extensions.

Friday, 9 October 2026

THE HUBRIS OF HOLBORN AND ST PANCRAS

One wakes, as one does, to the gentle hum of the central heating and the rather less gentle hum of the news. Labour, it appears, has retained Holborn and St Pancras by a majority described in the more enthusiastic quarters as “massive.” One pauses over the word. In the lexicon of modern politics, “massive” has come to mean anything larger than a modest majority in a safe seat after a by-election held on a day when half the electorate had better things to do. Still, the result stands. The new Member is in place. One is invited, indeed instructed by the more forthright observers of the metropolitan scene, to take a good long look at her.

Look one does. There is the inevitable photograph, the carefully lit portrait of arrival and achievement. The story that accompanies it is the approved one: a child refugee from Somalia, raised in Camden, risen through the local party machinery to the leadership of the council and now, with the departure of a former prime minister who had rather larger things on his mind, elevated to the House of Commons. It is a narrative of pure ascent, the sort that television producers and newspaper features editors reach for with the same automatic gesture with which a man reaches for his glass at the end of a long day. Progress, diversity, representation. The vocabulary is so well-rehearsed that it has long since ceased to require thought.

Yet the instruction was not merely to admire the biography. It was to contemplate the margin and then to perform a further, more uncomfortable calculation. While large sections of the native population spent the better part of two decades in a state of advanced moral anxiety—terrified that the mere observation of demographic change might earn them the scarlet letter of racism—the change itself proceeded with the quiet efficiency of a municipal works department. London, that once rather English city, became something else. The process was neither sudden nor secret. It was simply unmentionable in polite company. One could discuss the architecture, the restaurants, the theatres, the property market, the traffic, even the weather, but the shifting composition of the population itself was treated as a kind of meteorological phenomenon: inevitable, beyond human agency, and certainly beyond criticism.

The result, according to the more sardonic school of thought, is that the white Englishman or Englishwoman who still earns a living by ordinary means has discovered, somewhat late in the day, that the electoral arithmetic has altered beneath his or her feet. The seat that once belonged, in a cultural as well as a political sense, to a particular continuum of voters now belongs to another. The majority is not an accident of turnout or a temporary swing; it is the visible expression of a deeper reconfiguration. One’s opinion, once presumed to matter by the simple fact of residence and citizenship, has been rendered ornamental. One may still vote, of course. The ballot paper is still printed. The polling stations still open. But the outcome is no longer in serious doubt, and the doubts that remain are not the kind that can be resolved by argument.

There is a particular comedy in the timing. The same people who spent years insisting that any anxiety about numbers was a form of atavistic prejudice now find themselves confronted with numbers that have become, in certain constituencies, decisive. The fear of the epithet proved more powerful than the fear of the consequence. One kept quiet. One averted one’s gaze. One concentrated on the finer points of cuisine and the latest cycle lane. And while one was thus occupied, the demographic ledger was rewritten. The replacement, if that is the word one is still permitted to use without summoning a tribunal, is not a future event. It is a completed transaction. The receipts are already in the archive.

None of this is to deny the individual qualities of the new Member. Competence, diligence, and local knowledge are not the exclusive property of any ethnicity. The point is larger and more impersonal. It concerns the slow, almost administrative transformation of a city’s political character. Cities change. Empires rise and fall. Populations move. History is littered with such rearrangements, most of them accompanied by a great deal more blood than the present one. What distinguishes the contemporary version is the accompanying insistence that nothing of importance has occurred, that the old inhabitants are merely being asked to share a larger table, and that any sense of loss is evidence of a defective character rather than a reasonable response to observable reality.

The by-election itself was conducted with the usual low-grade pageantry. Turnout was modest. The Greens mounted a spirited challenge and were rewarded with a respectable second place, which their leadership will no doubt interpret as the beginning of a new era rather than the high-water mark of a temporary protest. The Conservatives and the various smaller parties performed their traditional roles as also-rans. Labour held the seat. The machinery of representation continues. Yet the larger lesson, for those willing to extract it, is that representation has a direction. Once a critical mass has shifted, the political weather changes permanently. The old majority becomes the new minority, and the minority discovers that its preferences, however passionately held, no longer command the decisive vote.

One is left, then, with the morning’s news and the slightly bitter aftertaste that accompanies it. The majority was not, in the end, quite as massive as the more triumphalist headlines suggested. The swing against Labour was noticeable. The Greens are emboldened. But none of that alters the fundamental arithmetic of the capital. The city has been remade. Those who once assumed it was theirs by inheritance or long residence have discovered that inheritance is a weak claim against numbers, and long residence is no defence against the quiet accumulation of new arrivals who vote as reliably as the old ones once did.

There is a certain dry satisfaction in observing the process from a distance, rather as one observes a slow-motion collapse of a building that was always going to fall. The scaffolding of polite discourse held for a long time. The warnings were dismissed as the fantasies of the disreputable. The language of replacement was declared beyond the pale. And then, one morning, the result arrives, the new Member is photographed, and the point is made with the clinical finality of a completed form. You were not going to be replaced. You have been. The only remaining question is whether anyone still thinks the observation itself is the problem.

Thursday, 8 October 2026

BREAKING THE FEAR MACHINE

One can almost hear the collective sigh of relief in certain air-conditioned rooms when the news broke of a young laboratory technician in Irkutsk dying of pneumonia of undetermined etiology. At last: something that might be dressed up as the next big thing. Pneumonic plague, the reports whispered. A research institute that actually works with the stuff. Contacts under observation. The whole apparatus of dread wheeled out with the weary professionalism of a travelling circus that has performed the same act too many times. If this were the real article, borders would be slamming shut faster than a politician’s mouth after an inconvenient question. They have not. President Trump has not grounded the world’s airlines. Nations have not sealed themselves like medieval cities under siege. 

The reason is simple enough for even a public-health bureaucrat to grasp if he were ever required to: the official Russian assessment, and the World Health Organization’s subsequent risk rating, treat the episode as contained, unconfirmed as plague, and of low to very low international concern. Contacts have been monitored and largely released. No secondary wave of confirmed cases has materialised. Yet the media machinery, that tireless generator of ambient anxiety, continues to hum. How touching, how almost endearing in its predictability, that the same circles who treated every seasonal flu as a potential civilisation-ender should now discover fresh reserves of solemnity over an unconfirmed Siberian pneumonia. One might have hoped that after the late unpleasantness with the coronavirus they would at least change the script. Instead they have returned to the well-thumbed playbook, confident that the audience has forgotten the last performance.

Consider the monkeypox episode of 2022, that short-lived festival of selective alarm. A real virus, yes, circulating with particular efficiency in specific networks, mostly among men who have sex with men. The public-health apparatus swung into action with the usual mixture of genuine concern and theatrical overreach. Emergency declarations were issued. Vaccine campaigns were launched with the urgency once reserved for actual pandemics. Media coverage oscillated between lurid speculation and careful euphemism. And then, almost as abruptly as it had arrived, the thing subsided. Cases fell. The emergency ended. The same voices that had treated it as the next great threat moved on without apology or reflection, as if the entire episode had been a useful dress rehearsal rather than a demonstration of how quickly narrative can outrun evidence.

The exasperation one feels is not primarily with the virus, which does what viruses do, but with the human operators who treat every laboratory mishap or regional cluster as an opportunity to reimpose the psychology of 2020. The global managerial class—those itinerant experts, foundation-funded influencers, and institutional spokespeople who discovered during the last crisis that fear is a more reliable currency than competence—appear constitutionally incapable of learning the simplest lesson: people notice. They notice when the same rhetorical devices are recycled. They notice when borders stay open for a “plague” that would, in any earlier century, have emptied ports. They notice when the story requires perpetual escalation just to maintain the necessary level of dread before an election cycle.

There is something almost touching in the persistence. Having watched one carefully cultivated scare lose momentum, the operators simply select another pathogen, preferably one with historical resonance and a suitably medieval name, and try again. Plague carries the right cultural freight. It summons images of rat-infested harbours and blackened extremities. Never mind that the actual epidemiological picture in Irkutsk remains stubbornly ordinary by the standards of high-containment laboratories that have handled far more exotic agents without collapsing civilisation. The point is never the specific microbe. The point is the atmosphere.

Fortunately, the atmosphere is no longer quite so easy to control. When Elon Musk acquired the platform formerly known as Twitter and turned it into X, he did something more consequential than most of the professional commentary class have yet admitted. He removed the primary throttle on spontaneous, unfiltered contradiction. The old gatekeeping arrangements—whereby certain narratives could be amplified while competing ones were throttled, labelled, or disappeared—lost much of their force. Ordinary people, scientists outside the approved circuits, and even the occasional laboratory technician with an inconvenient timeline can now reach audiences that once required institutional permission. The result is not chaos, as the professional worriers predicted, but a rough and imperfect form of accountability. Claims that once travelled unopposed now meet immediate, often rude, scrutiny. 

The monkeypox cycle already showed the limits of the method; the current Siberian episode is testing those limits again under less favourable conditions. No less instructive was the coverage of hantavirus, that sporadic rodent-borne inconvenience which certain corners of the press insisted on treating as the next scheduled apocalypse. A few infections linked to mouse droppings in remote cabins or rural outposts would trigger the familiar cascade: sombre graphics, expert warnings about aerosol transmission, and the solemn implication that civilisation itself might soon be gasping for air. The tone suggested Black Death 2.0 with better production values. Then the cases remained local, the fatalities stayed mercifully few, and the same outlets that had hyped the threat simply packed up their cameras and moved on, as if the entire exercise had been a useful test of how long the public could be kept on edge by a virus that had never shown the slightest ambition to become a global spectacle. The pattern was becoming hard to miss.

One does not need to believe in a single smoke-filled room of cartoon villains to recognise a pattern of incentives. Institutions that expanded their budgets and authority during the last emergency have every reason to keep the sense of permanent emergency alive. Media organisations that discovered the commercial value of sustained anxiety have every reason to inflate the next candidate. Politicians who found that emergency powers simplify governance have every reason to look for fresh pretexts. The rest of us are under no obligation to play along.

What finally began to puncture the solemnity was the memes. Where once the official narrative could proceed with its gravity largely intact, a single well-timed image—a cartoon rat in a hazmat suit, a side-by-side of successive “this time it’s different” headlines, or a simple caption reducing the latest laboratory drama to farce—could travel farther and faster than any carefully worded press release. The scaremongers found themselves confronting not sober counter-arguments but the collective laughter of people who had seen the same performance too many times. Memes did what earnest rebuttals often failed to achieve: they made the apparatus look faintly absurd, and once something looks absurd it becomes considerably harder to fear. In that sense the humble meme became one of the more effective public-health interventions of the age.

So let us express the appropriate sentiment with the clarity the occasion deserves. To the professional scare-mongers, the foundation-funded amplifiers, the institutional voices still hoping that the next pathogen will restore the deference they briefly enjoyed: this particular performance is already failing its dress rehearsal. The population has seen the set design before. The props look second-hand. The dialogue is recycled. Thanks in no small part to an open platform that no longer pretends neutrality while enforcing orthodoxy, the audience can now shout back in real time.

May the present scare join its predecessors in the growing archive of overplayed hands. May the next one meet the same fate. And may those who keep trying this transparent routine eventually discover that the only thing more exhausting than perpetual crisis is the spectacle of people who refuse, at long last, to be perpetually crisis-managed.

Wednesday, 7 October 2026

EVA MARIE SAINT (1924 - 2026): AN OBITUARY

Eva Marie Saint, who has died at the improbable age of 102, spent a lifetime proving that Hollywood’s preferred model of female stardom—blonde, luminous, and slightly too good for the material—could also possess a spine. She arrived on screen in 1954 looking as if she had been borrowed from a particularly tasteful stained-glass window, and left it seven decades later having outlasted almost everyone who once mistook her for fragile.

Her debut remains the sort of unfair advantage that makes lesser careers look like hard work. In On the Waterfront she played Edie Doyle opposite Marlon Brando’s mumbled longshoreman and somehow managed to look both virginal and knowing while the Method swirled around her like steam from a waterfront café. The Academy, in one of its rare moments of clarity, handed her an Oscar for supporting actress. She accepted it while pregnant, thereby achieving the rare double of looking radiant in victory and quietly announcing that she had better things to do than linger at the after-party.

Five years later Alfred Hitchcock, never a man to leave a cool blonde unmolested by plot, cast her as Eve Kendall in North by Northwest. Opposite Cary Grant she performed the delicate feat of being both the bait and the angler. Where lesser actresses might have settled for icy glamour, Saint suggested that the ice contained a rather sharp intelligence, and that the glamour was merely the packaging. Hitchcock, who specialised in turning women into elegant problems, found in her a solution that retained its own agency. It was almost unsporting.

She declined to become a perpetual starlet, which in Hollywood counts as a form of quiet rebellion. Marriage to the director Jeffrey Hayden lasted sixty-five years—an eternity by local standards—and produced two children, several grandchildren, and the sort of domestic stability that studio publicists used to invent when they could not find any actual scandals. She worked when the part interested her, ignored the rest, and continued into her nineties with the serene air of someone who had long since realised that fame is a temporary inconvenience rather than a vocation.

In an industry that treats longevity as a kind of aesthetic failure, Saint simply refused to wither on cue. She remained the same cool, precise presence, as if time itself had been instructed to keep its distance. One suspects she accepted death with the same composed efficiency she once brought to a Hitchcock close-up: a raised eyebrow, a faint smile, and the quiet knowledge that the scene was over.

Tuesday, 6 October 2026

JEFFREY ARCHER (1940 - 2026): AN OBITUARY

Jeffrey Archer, who has died aged 86 in the precise manner he might have plotted for one of his more tidy-minded characters—suddenly, peacefully, and between writing sessions—occupied that peculiar British niche reserved for men who treat life as a first draft in need of vigorous revision. Born in London in 1940 and raised in Somerset with the sort of opportunistic geography that later served him well in fiction, he rose, fell, rose again, and occasionally tripped over his own footnotes with a consistency that would have made lesser storytellers jealous.

As a Conservative MP for Louth in the late 1960s he displayed an early gift for narrative compression: a political career abbreviated by financial embarrassment, followed by a triumphant second act as deputy chairman of the party under Margaret Thatcher. The House of Lords eventually claimed him as a life peer, a distinction he wore with the same brisk confidence he brought to airport paperbacks. Politics, however, proved less forgiving than his readers. The 1987 libel victory against the Daily Star, complete with half a million pounds in damages, later unravelled into a conviction for perjury. Prison followed, a four-year sentence of which he served just over two. He emerged, as only Archer could, with material for diaries and the unshaken conviction that the story was still his to tell.

Meanwhile the novels multiplied. Not a Penny More, Not a Penny Less launched the enterprise; Kane and Abel turned it into an industry. More than three hundred million copies later, the Clifton Chronicles and their various cousins had colonised airport lounges from Wellington to wherever the next flight was going. Critics sniffed at the prose; the public, more democratically inclined, kept buying. Archer repaid them with the tireless energy of a man who understood that a bestseller list is simply another form of constituency surgery.

He leaves behind Dame Mary, his wife of sixty years, two sons, and an assortment of grandchildren. His final novel, Adam and Eve, appears posthumously with the timing of a man who always knew when to exit the stage—preferably just before the reviews. In the end Archer’s greatest plot was himself: ambitious, resilient, occasionally economical with the truth, and permanently convinced that the next chapter would be the best yet.

Sunday, 4 October 2026

STRICTLY NOT BOTHERED

There comes a moment in the life of every television institution when the sequins stop twinkling and start to look like the residual glitter from last year’s Christmas card, stubbornly clinging to the carpet long after the festive season has been packed away. Strictly Come Dancing has reached that moment. The glitterball, once a gleaming emblem of Saturday-night optimism, now hangs there like a disco ball in a working men's social club that has seen better decades, better carpets, and worse decisions. The show has become tired, stale, clichéd and so thoroughly trope-ridden that one half expects the professional dancers to arrive already locked in a predictable lift, spinning the same celebrity through the same sequence of emotional arcs that have been rehearsed since the early Blair years.

What began as a gloriously improbable collision of ballroom formality and celebrity incompetence has settled into a formula as rigid as Craig Revel-Horwood’s posture. Each series unfolds with the comforting inevitability of a provincial pantomime: the early weeks of endearing woodenness, the mid-season “journey” montages set to swelling strings, the tearful confessions about personal demons conquered through the medium of the foxtrot, and the final stretch in which someone who once starred in a soap or played a bit-part in a reality show discovers, to collective gasps, that they can actually point their toes. The judges deliver their verdicts with the solemnity of oracles who have forgotten they are reading from the same laminated card they used last year. “It was a bit safe,” says Shirley Ballas. “You lit up the floor,” insists Motsi Mabuse's cleavage. And somewhere in the middle, Anton Du Beke beams as if he has just invented the concept of enthusiasm itself.

The tropes pile up like discarded feather boas. There is the celebrity who 'never danced a step in their life' and yet, by week five, is executing a paso doble with the intensity of someone who has just remembered the rent is due. There is the professional partner whose motivational speeches could be spliced into any series without anyone noticing the join. There is the group number that exists primarily to fill the space between ad breaks and the moment when the audience is invited to vote as if the fate of Western civilisation depended on whether a former footballer can master the cha-cha. Even the wardrobe has lost its capacity to surprise. The dresses still shed sequins by the kilo, but one suspects the cleaning staff no longer bother to vacuum them up; they simply wait for the next series to begin and let the cycle continue.

Of course, there was one glorious exception. In 2020, that annus horribilis when the nation sat indoors measuring its days in sourdough loaves and government briefings, Bill Bailey arrived on Strictly like a genial uncle who had somehow wandered into the wrong party and decided to stay. His victory was a rare feel-good moment in the year of COVID, a reminder that joy could still be manufactured under laboratory conditions. Bailey, with his wild hair and the air of a man who might at any moment explain the finer points of ornithology while executing a perfect reverse turn, somehow made the whole enterprise feel less like a production line and more like a shared national hug. For a few weeks the glitterball seemed to spin with genuine purpose. Then the credits rolled, the pandemic ground on, and Strictly returned the following year to its usual business of recycling the same emotional beats with different faces attached.

That business is now looking distinctly threadbare. The current series features a line-up that, while perfectly pleasant, lacks the gravitational pull of earlier years. Soap stars, a hairstylist, a YouTuber, a former footballer – all perfectly respectable citizens, no doubt, but hardly the sort of names that once made the nation rearrange its Saturday evenings. Meanwhile, across the schedule, a far more glittering collection of celebrities has signed up for this year’s edition of The Celebrity Traitors. Michael Sheen, Richard E. Grant, Miranda Hart, Joe Lycett, Maya Jama, James Blunt, Bella Ramsey, Ross Kemp – the sort of roster that once would have been fought over by the Strictly producers with the desperation of a professional dancer eyeing the last free parking space at Television Centre. And the irony is, that the whole murderous enterprise is hosted by Claudia Winkleman, the woman who for years co-presided over Strictly’s sequinned court with a fringe that could double as a national security asset.

One can almost hear the conversation in some agent’s office: “Strictly? Lovely, of course, but the public has seen the lift, the cry, the redemption arc. How about a Scottish castle, some cloaks, and the chance to stab your fellow thespians in the metaphorical back while Claudia watches with that faintly amused expression she perfected wathcing Jill Halfpenny do the jive?” The simple truth is, that The Traitors offers genuine suspense rather than manufactured journey. It trades the predictability of the scoreboard for the delicious uncertainty of human treachery. Celebrities who once might have risked a sprained ankle in the name of a glitterball now prefer the psychological bruises of the round table. Strictly, by contrast, continues to offer the same reassuringly familiar product, as if the audience were a loyal customer who has never noticed that the packaging has grown slightly faded.

Television formats, like ageing ballroom dancers, eventually lose their spring. Strictly Come Dancing has given us two decades of sparkle, the occasional genuine triumph, and one unforgettable Bailey-shaped ray of light in the darkness of 2020. But the steps have become too well-known, the outcomes too telegraphed, the sequins too familiar. The nation, ever restless, has moved on to darker and more interesting games. The glitterball still turns, of course. It just no longer feels as if it is lighting up anything very new.

Saturday, 3 October 2026

VIVE LA REVOLUTION? THE CLIPBOARD VS THE MOLOTOV

I have to be honest – a phrase that in political writing usually signals the imminent arrival of a carefully rehearsed falsehood – I do not think even Marine Le Pen can save France now. The statement has a certain melancholy ring to it, like a man announcing that the last bottle of decent claret in the cellar has turned to vinegar. France, after all, has spent the better part of two centuries perfecting the art of being saved, only to discover that the saviours keep mislaying the instructions. Le Pen is the latest candidate for the role of national redeemer, a woman whose supporters regard her as Joan of Arc with better hair and a more realistic grasp of border control. Yet the practical problem remains stubbornly unromantic: how, precisely, does one deport large numbers of people who have already demonstrated a lively talent for setting fire to the furniture?

The current disturbances – those charming outbreaks of civic enthusiasm in which high-school students, professional agitators, and the usual collection of opportunistic pyromaniacs convert educational grievances into urban theatre – offer a useful preview. The French have always treated a riot as a form of national conversation, rather like the British treat a queue. What begins as a complaint about overcrowded classrooms and underpaid teachers rapidly acquires Molotov cocktails, burning bins, and the sort of tear-gas fog that makes the streets of Paris look like a particularly unsuccessful Impressionist painting. The authorities respond with the usual mixture of stern communiqués and rubber bullets. Everyone feels better afterwards, or at least more exhausted. The point is not the specific cause of the present trouble; the point is the readiness with which large groups of people will take to the streets the moment they sense that the state is about to do something they dislike.

Now imagine translating that readiness into the more ambitious project of deportation. The official version, endlessly rehearsed by politicians of every stripe when the cameras are rolling, involves polite notices, civil servants with clipboards, and a series of orderly departures reminiscent of a well-run package holiday. One pictures the deportees being guided toward the airport with the gentle hand gestures one uses to hail a taxi. The reality, as anyone who has watched French urban unrest for more than five minutes will suspect, is unlikely to resemble a travel brochure. People who feel their presence is under threat do not, as a rule, form orderly queues. They form crowds. Crowds form barricades. Barricades attract the attention of the more theatrical elements of society, and before long one is back in the familiar territory of burning cars and broken glass.

Which brings us to the indelicate question of force. Will Le Pen, should she ever find herself in a position to issue orders, possess the necessary resolve – the “balls,” in the vernacular of the original observation – to authorise measures of genuine severity? Shoot-to-kill policies have a bracing clarity on paper. In practice they require a military and a police force prepared to implement them against people who may look, in the heat of the moment, rather like ordinary citizens, or at least like the cousins of ordinary citizens. The French military has historically shown itself capable of remarkable ruthlessness when the occasion demanded, from Algeria to various African adventures that polite society prefers not to discuss at dinner. Whether that capacity survives in an age of smartphones, continuous media scrutiny, and the permanent possibility of being prosecuted by the next government is another matter. Armies, like individuals, develop a sense of self-preservation. Following orders that might later be described as criminal is a career risk few officers are eager to take when the political wind can change with a single election.

The same problem applies, with only minor adjustments of accent and bureaucracy, to Britain. We flatter ourselves that our disorders are more restrained, that we riot with a certain native reserve. In truth we are simply slower to reach the matchbox stage. The underlying arithmetic remains identical: large-scale removal of people who do not wish to be removed will not be accomplished by stern letters from the Home Office and the occasional charter flight. It will require sustained, visible, and potentially violent coercion. The British public has shown itself capable of considerable toughness when it feels sufficiently provoked, but it has also shown a talent for collective amnesia once the television pictures become unpleasant. Politicians know this. They therefore prefer to speak of “robust enforcement” while privately hoping that the problem will somehow solve itself through demography, economics, or divine intervention.

There is a deeper absurdity at work here. Nations that have spent decades constructing elaborate systems of human rights, judicial review, and international obligations suddenly discover that those same systems make decisive action almost impossible. The result is a kind of political theatre in which leaders on the right promise firmness they cannot deliver, while leaders on the left promise compassion they cannot afford. The audience, meanwhile, grows steadily more cynical. France, with its genius for intellectualising its own crises, turns the whole spectacle into a seminar. Britain, with its genius for muddling through, pretends that another committee will eventually produce a solution. In both cases the essential difficulty is the same: the modern democratic state has become extremely good at describing problems and remarkably bad at solving the ones that require the actual use of power.

None of this is to suggest that the alternative – permanent paralysis – is attractive. Societies that lose the capacity to enforce their own borders eventually lose the capacity to enforce much else. The sardonic observer is left with the uncomfortable suspicion that the real choice is not between kindness and cruelty, but between controlled firmness now and uncontrolled chaos later. Whether any politician currently on offer possesses the combination of ruthlessness, legitimacy, and institutional support required to choose the former remains, at best, an open question. Le Pen may yet prove more formidable than her critics allow. Or she may discover, like many before her, that the machinery of the state has developed a quiet genius for refusing to turn when the operator most needs it.

In the end one is reminded of the old observation that the French invent a new political system every generation or so, while the British prefer to keep the old one and simply stop using the bits that no longer work. Both approaches have their charms. Neither, at present, looks equal to the task of persuading large numbers of unwilling people to leave the country without first turning the streets into a stage set for the next round of televised disorder. The taxi, it seems, will not be arriving any time soon. And the hand gestures, however elegant, are unlikely to be enough.