Monday, 16 November 2026

E-I, A.I, NO ...

Britain once specialised in inventing the future with the cheerful air of a nation that had nothing better to do on a wet Tuesday. The steam engine hissed into existence, railways stitched the countryside into a timetable, television brought moving pictures into the parlour before anyone had quite decided what to do with them, penicillin quietly saved lives while its discoverer remained modest about the mould, and the foundations of modern computing plus the World Wide Web itself arrived with the understated efficiency of a civil servant who had simply done the sums correctly. For a while the British appeared to regard progress as a natural by-product of mild eccentricity and a decent education.

Then something shifted. Not with a bang, of course – that would have been far too dramatic – but with the soft, insistent rustle of committee minutes and the gentle accumulation of forms in triplicate. Decades of political failure, underinvestment, EU bureaucracy and regulatory obsession arrived not as a single catastrophe but as a long, damp season in which the inventive spirit was gradually filed under “pending further consultation”. One can almost picture the scene: a bright idea appears, is examined for its environmental impact, its diversity implications, its potential to inconvenience a distant stakeholder, and is finally returned with a polite note suggesting it be reconsidered after the next election cycle.

The result is a country that now watches the AI revolution unfold with the slightly aggrieved expression of a once-great athlete who has taken up competitive form-filling. The algorithms race ahead elsewhere; the models grow more capable; the applications multiply. Meanwhile Britain, having once supplied the world with the tools to reshape itself, finds itself largely dependent on others to build the next set. There is a certain austere comedy in this. The nation that gave the world the means to compute and to communicate now specialises in the more refined art of regulating itself out of the conversation.

One need not romanticise the past. The old inventiveness was frequently messy, underfunded, and driven by individuals who would today struggle to obtain the necessary permits to light a Bunsen burner. Yet it possessed a useful indifference to the precise wording of subsection 4(b) of the relevant directive. Today the caution is almost admirable in its thoroughness. Every new capability is greeted less with curiosity than with a careful inventory of risks, followed by a lengthy process designed to ensure that no risk is ever taken. The effect is rather like equipping a racing car with so many safety features that it can no longer leave the garage without a convoy of inspectors.

The irony is sharpened by the original urgency of the discussion that prompted these reflections. Artificial intelligence is not merely another consumer gadget; it is already altering the texture of everyday systems – airspace, banking, hospitals, emergency communications – in ways that demand both competence and independence. A country that once prided itself on building the infrastructure of the modern world might reasonably be expected to insist on retaining some sovereign capacity in the technologies that now threaten to redefine security and prosperity. Instead one detects a familiar hesitation, as if the proper response to a rapidly evolving threat is another round of consultation papers.

It is, in its way, quite an achievement. From inventing the future to regulating ourselves out of it requires a special kind of consistency. The same national temperament that once produced world-changing devices now produces world-class procedures for ensuring that nothing world-changing occurs without exhaustive prior approval. One can almost admire the thoroughness. The British have not merely lost a race; they have perfected the art of arriving late while explaining, with perfect courtesy, why arriving on time would have been irresponsible.

There remains, of course, the possibility of recovery. The inventive habit is not entirely extinct; it merely finds itself operating under heavier constraints and with thinner encouragement. Whether the constraints can be eased before the dependence becomes permanent is another matter. For the moment the spectacle continues: a nation that once busied itself inventing the future now busies itself ensuring that the future arrives only after it has been properly risk-assessed, impact-assessed, and preferably invented somewhere else. The achievement is, as noted, considerable. One only hopes the historians of the future will have the paperwork in order when they come to record it.